

SOVIETS ARE UNRELIABLE FRIENDS

January 1959

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The field of international politics has never been the ideal locality for the burgeoning of idealism. Nevertheless, there has always been throughout history a basic aspiration towards some form of honesty in dealings between nations since it is generally agreed that without some degree of confidence little would remain except spiritual and physical anarchy.

However, an entirely new concept of dealings between nations has been injected into the international scene by the manner in which the Soviets have dealt with other nations in recent years. From it there appears to be one basic lack and that is the total absence of the aura of confidence.

That this should be so in international dealings is hardly surprising, for the way in which the Soviets behave among themselves faithfully mirrors their way of handling things in the outside world. One has only to consider the fate of such leaders of the Bolshevik revolution as Rykov, Radek, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Trotsky. They all ended in disgrace, branded as traitors. Why? The reason appears to be that because of some deviation from the political tactic of the day they ceased to enjoy the confidence of the leader of the moment and their contribution of many years of hard work counted for nothing.

If such are the conditions of political life in the Soviet Union, there is small wonder that their behavior in dealings with other nations should run along the same lines, thereby causing a great deal of confusion among world leaders who are continually groping to find the basis of any particular action. Such conduct makes it extremely difficult to formulate any well-defined policy.

A good illustration of the continual twistings and turnings of Soviet policy is the manner in which the Soviets have behaved towards France's new leader, General de Gaulle.

When the General first was Premier just after the war, his moderate foreign policy and his acceptance of Communists

in the Cabinet caused Moscow to shower him with eulogies and professions of friendship.

However, this was of short duration and by 1951 the Soviet vane had changed direction. De Gaulle was being reviled as a warmonger and the party that followed him was said to be one of "open fascist reaction."

However, as time went on it became apparent that France's difficulties were mounting and that it was becoming more and more likely that de Gaulle would have to be called in to cut the Gordian knot thereby becoming once again an important world figure.

This caused the Kremlin to review its position towards de Gaulle. In 1957, the Moscow military publishing house, in the preface to the Russian edition of de Gaulle's memoirs, bestowed high praise on him. It said that "at the critical period of World War II he showed perseverance and persistence and he was, in this regard, supported by the French people as the only true protector of the national interests of the sovereignty and greatness of France."

When, in the Spring of 1958, it looked as though de Gaulle's return to power was imminent, the Soviets began a friendship campaign in his favor in the pages of their Literary Gazette. During the first months after he became Premier again, the Soviets carefully refrained from criticizing him openly, although the French Communist Party newspapers branded him a fascist and enemy of the republic. It looked as though the Kremlin had decided to be friendly to de Gaulle even if it meant leaving the French Communists in the lurch and withdrawing moral support from the Algerian rebels.

This tactic was undoubtedly motivated by a number of considerations. It was certainly designed to cause de Gaulle to be friendly towards the USSR and perhaps even to envisage a renewal of the former Franco-Russian alliance. Also, remembering de Gaulle's wartime differences with the British and Americans, the Russians probably hoped they would be able to use de Gaulle as a tool to split the West and eventually to lure him into the neutralist camp.

De Gaulle, however, did not fulfill these expectations and when it became apparent that the maneuver had failed, the Soviets again changed their tune and the de Gaulle government again became a target for attack.

At the moment it looks as though the Middle East were that part of the world which stands in the greatest danger of being duped by Moscow's transitory professions of friendship. Since 1955, when the present Soviet friendship campaign was launched through the arms pact with Egypt, the Kremlin has incessantly proclaimed itself to be the greatest friend the Arabs have in the world and their champion against colonialism and imperialism.

This is somewhat of an anomaly since it is evident that the Soviet Union is the biggest colonial-imperialist power on earth and the only expanding one. The Soviet Union not only has maintained its colonial areas in Central Asia and the Caucasus, but has also annexed Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Carpatho-Ruthenia and Bessarabia. It has extended over Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria a protectorate which is but a hair's breadth from annexation.

While the Russians are proclaiming themselves the friends of the Muslims, it cannot be forgotten that for the past 41 years, they have incessantly oppressed their Muslim subjects, denying them not only political freedom, but even the freedom to practice their faith. Just after the first World War there were about 7,000 mosques in European Russia alone. Today, there are only some 1,300 in the entire Soviet Union.

Another case in point is Iraq. When Russia first attempted to penetrate the Middle East, it apparently thought that its objectives would be amply served by having Egypt's Nasser in its pocket, thereby controlling the economic life of the UAR. However, the Russians are no longer so sure of him and want a man whom they can fully control. This explains their recent attempts to infiltrate Iraq and to gain political control over Premier Kassim and over his country's rich oil deposits.

Russian propaganda goes to great lengths to prove its steadfastness in friendship, but closer examination reveals it to be a weak reed that shifts with every political wind.

NEHRU RECOGNIZES THE EVILS OF COMMUNISM

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For many years the West has failed to understand why Indian Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru, an unquestioned partisan of democracy, should be such a stout apologist for Communism. Consistently he interpreted the West's positions and motives in the worst possible light and gave the Communists the benefit of every doubt.

This policy was especially noticeable in 1956. After the Soviet army repression of the Hungarian freedom revolt, Nehru shocked the Free World by telling the Indian Parliament that, in his opinion, the Hungarian situation had been exaggerated by the West to divert attention from its own actions in the Middle East and that Soviet intervention in Hungary was justified under the provisions of the Warsaw Pact. Asked what he thought about the Communist deportation to Russia of thousands of Hungarian youths after the uprising had been quelled, Nehru dismissed the matter with the blithe statement that the youths were probably being taken to Russia on an inspection trip.

Nehru also pleased the Communists--and offended the West--by his repeated attacks on Western "imperialism" and "colonialism." He seemed oblivious to the fact that since the end of the war a score of countries, including his own, had been given their independence by the West while, in contrast, the Soviets have clung to their empire in Central Asia. They have, in addition, annexed Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, Carpatho-Ruthenia, and parts of Finland. Nehru equally ignored the fact that the Soviet Union reduced the countries of Eastern Europe to a status equivalent to annexation.

In return for his benevolent attitude towards Communism and in recognition of his position as leader of the world's major uncommitted (i.e., neutralist) state, the Soviet propagandists have carefully refrained from attacking him. Even Nehru's intermittent harsh attacks on Indian Communists and their policies evoked no criticism from Soviet and international Communism.

This honeymoon has now ended. The December 1958 issue of the World Marxist Review, which is published in Prague as a journal of International Communism, includes an article extremely critical of Nehru. Its author--Pavel Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to Communist China and a leading Communist theoretician--asserts that Nehru does not know socialism when he sees it, since his ideas on that subject are "vague and abstract." Yudin also charges that Nehru's government functions largely as "an instrument of violence against the people, the workers and the peasants" for the sole benefit of rich landlords. Every year, according to Yudin, thousands of innocent people are jailed in India. The Soviet author also assails Nehru for the lack of land reform in India.

This initiation of a Communist propaganda attack on Nehru was not entirely a surprise. It had been expected since last August. At that time Nehru published in the Economic Review, official organ of his Congress Party, an article entitled "The Basic Approach." The article revealed that Nehru had undergone a basic change in his thinking, for the article was sharply critical of Communism and the Soviet system.

The Indian leader, who once proudly accepted the description of "a Marxist by intellectual conviction," now asserts that "Communism has definitely allied itself to the approach of violence. Even if it does not indulge normally in physical violence, its thought is violent and it does not seek change by persuasion or peaceful, democratic pressures, but by coercion and indeed by destruction and extermination." This is a very different Nehru from the one who, in a speech in December 1951, declared that he had "no quarrel with the fundamental principles of Communism."

In considering the Soviet denial of basic political freedoms, the leader of democratic India has now realized that Communism's "suppression of individual freedom brings about powerful reactions. Its unfortunate association with violence encourages a certain evil tendency in human beings."

Having finally come to this realization, which is very reminiscent of the views expressed in The New Class by Milovan Djilas, Nehru is forced by his own logic to revise his

evaluation of the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising. He now rejects the Soviet contention that the uprising was the work of "fascists" in the pay of "western imperialists," and writes that "what happened in Hungary demonstrates that the desire for national freedom is stronger than any ideology and cannot be ultimately suppressed. What happened in Hungary was not essentially a conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. It represented nationalism striving for freedom from foreign control."

Although Nehru continues to praise the virtues of socialism as an economic system, he emphatically rejects the claim that Marxism as interpreted and practiced by the Soviet Union is a valid creed for the achievement of economic betterment. "Marxist economics," he writes, "...are in many ways out of date." He scorns Communism's claim of inevitability, asserting that "it is absurd to imagine that out of conflict the social progressive forces which the Communists claim to be are bound to win." Deriding the Marxist view that contradictions within capitalist society will lead to this (class) conflict and the triumph of Communism, Nehru comments that actually there are "growing contradictions within the rigid framework of Communism."

In discussing this same point elsewhere in his article, Nehru indicates his belief that Communism, far from being inevitable, must ultimately fail. As he puts it, "Communism comes in the wake of...disillusionment and offers some kind of faith, some kind of discipline. To some extent it fills a vacuum. It succeeds in some measure by giving a content to man's life. But in spite of its apparent success, it fails, partly because of its rigidity, but, even more so, because it ignores certain essential needs of human nature."

Communism, according to Nehru, has been "tainted" by its passion for violence and its confusion of means with ends. In his opinion, "democracy and socialism are means to an end, not the end itself," and any system which ignores and sacrifices the individual for what is considered the good of society, as Communism does, is a distortion. To use Nehru's own words, "we should not forget the basic human element and

the fact that our objective is individual improvement and the lessening of inequalities; and we must not forget the ethical and spiritual aspects of life which are ultimately the basis of culture and civilization and which have given some meaning to life."

The Nehru article constitutes a strong indictment of Communism and the Soviet system. Its importance is enhanced by the fact that its author is anything but a professional anti-Communist or a disgruntled former Communist. As the reasoned thinking of a leading neutralist not attracted by either the East or West, the article must necessarily be considered with great respect. That it is a telling blow against Communism is proven by Yudin's counter-attack. As the old proverb goes, "It is always the truth that hurts." No amount of disparagement of Nehru by Soviet propagandists can conceal the fact that one of the world's leading neutralists and statesmen has weighed Communism and found it wanting.

NEW SOVIET WARMANSHIP

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The volcano of international affairs is again threatening to erupt. No sooner had the Taiwan Straits tension of last fall subsided than the Soviets created a new crisis over Berlin. The world breathed a sigh of relief at the apparent abandonment by the Communist Chinese of plans for an immediate assault on the Quemoy islands. It has now been forced to realize that the Communist Bloc has no intention of giving it respite from the successive crises and threats of war which have become the normal state of affairs in the post-war world.

It is not surprising that the latest volcanic rumbling emanates from Berlin. The German problem and its many ramifications have been one of the most persistent sources of East-West tensions in the Cold War era. Berlin itself has figured in previous crises, notably in the blockade of 1948.

The present crisis began on 10 November when Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union planned to turn over its rights and functions in Berlin to East German authorities, with whom the West would thereafter have to deal. This prospect was termed unacceptable by the Western Powers (United States, United Kingdom and France), since the present status of Berlin rests on international agreements. Moreover, the Western Powers do not recognize the East German regime as a bona fide government and refuse to deal with its officials. On 27 November the crisis became worse when the USSR, in a formal diplomatic note, demanded that West Berlin be made a "free city," and asserted that the Soviet Union would take unilateral action to that end on 1 June 1959 if the Western Powers did not agree to negotiate on the subject before that time.

Careful observers of the Soviet scene are convinced that the creation of a new Berlin crisis following the easing of the Quemoy tension is not accidental. They believe that the Chinese Communists abandoned their aggressive designs on the Quemoy islands as the result of pressure by the Kremlin, which was not willing to risk a third world war over an issue which was important only to Peiping.

While the true nature of the Peiping - Moscow relationship can only be conjectured, these observers believe that China bowed to Soviet insistence only in return for a quid pro quo: the Chinese Communists would agree to lessen their activities in the Taiwan Straits provided the Soviets agreed to create trouble for the Free World elsewhere. As events have shown, the Soviets picked Berlin as the place in which to take the action demanded by Peiping.

The choice of Berlin is eminently logical from the Communist point of view. Since the end of the war the principal Communist satrap in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany--since 1949 the so-called German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik - DDR)--has been Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Premier of the DDR and, more important, First Secretary of the East German Communist Party. Officially the Party is euphemistically termed the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheit Partei Deutschlands - SED).

Ulbricht, although a Kremlin favorite because of his slavish loyalty, is far from being popular with members of the SED. They resent his arrogant manner and autocratic control of party affairs, and no one is more hated by every element of East German society. More than once ranking SED leaders have tried to get rid of him, only to reap disgrace and abuse when Ulbricht, with the backing of his Soviet masters, successfully defended his position. The most recent victims were Karl Schirdewan, Erich Wollweber and Fred Oelsner, whom Ulbricht sent into oblivion in February 1958.

The East German Communists are today still hoping somehow to oust Ulbricht, whom they blame also for the increasingly desperate economic condition of the country. It appears that the Soviets, finding Ulbricht too useful and loyal a puppet to depose, are attempting to bribe the anti-Ulbricht elements to abandon their opposition by promising, in return, to present East Germany with West Berlin. Once the Western Powers withdrew their garrisons, the proposed "free city" of West Berlin would soon be taken over by the DDR.

The existence of a free, democratic and prosperous Berlin in the center of a rigidly disciplined and economically struggling East Germany is an unpleasant thorn in the side of the DDR regime. Life in East Berlin, as in all the

DDR, is hard and comfortless. Yet its residents have only to cross the sector boundary into West Berlin to see stores filled with goods of all kinds, restaurants where zealous meals may be obtained at reasonable prices, streets crowded with happy people who can voice their opinions freely without fear of arrest and imprisonment. The contrast understandably causes further dissatisfaction with life under Communism.

While the SED has eagerly espoused the Soviet plan to remove this threat to the existence of the DDR regime, the plan also serves the Kremlin in another way. The Soviets, of course, wish to ensure the security of their puppet government but, beyond that, they are also thinking of their own safety. Although they assert that they dislike the present arrangement because West Berlin now serves "fascist agitators" as a base for espionage and subversion, what they really dislike is the fact that a free West Berlin serves as a window into their system. And the Soviets cannot afford to permit the rest of the world to see a rejection of the Communist way of life.

This is precisely what West Berlin does permit. Since 1945 there has been a constant flow of refugees from East Germany into the haven of West Berlin. Each one of the more than 3.2 million persons who chose freedom between 1945 and 1958 is an eloquent witness to life under Communism. Each has chosen to abandon home, property, relatives, career, everything, rather than continue to live under Communist rule.

These refugees, moreover, are not merely the economically impoverished or politically persecuted. Even East German professionals--doctors, lawyers, engineers, professors, economists, etc.--who enjoy special financial and housing privileges, are represented in large numbers. So many doctors, for example, have fled East Germany that the East German regime has been forced to consider the importation of doctors from other satellite states.

Having been maneuvered by the Chinese Communists into promising to create a new crisis, the Soviets clearly chose Berlin as the spot most likely to advance a number of

Communist objectives simultaneously. They hope not only to bolster the position of Ulbricht and his government and stop the flow of refugees; but, by forcing the West to deal with DDR officials on matters concerning access to Berlin, the Soviets hope to obtain for the DDR a respectability and status which it now notably lacks. In its 10 years of existence, the DDR has not been recognized by a single country other than the 11 Soviet Bloc members and Yugoslavia. Even the latter, which only extended recognition less than 2 years ago, is now thinking of withdrawing it. In contrast, the Federal German Republic (West Germany) has won recognition from 70 countries, including the USSR.

It remains to be seen whether the present Berlin crisis will lead to a real eruption. The Western Powers have made it clear to the Soviets that their presence in Berlin is based on the rights of occupation and numerous international agreements of which the USSR is also a signatory. They have also made it clear that they do not intend to submit passively to this latest example of Soviet disregard and violation of its pledged word. The peoples of the world can only hope that the Soviets, realizing the West's determination, will not push matters to the point of war. But even if this crisis should pass, the world must expect the Soviet-inspired volcano to begin rumbling elsewhere within a short time. Yesterday Quemoy, today Berlin, tomorrow....

PALABRAS CRUZADAS

	1	2		3	4	5		6		
	G	O	M	U	N	I	S	M	O	
7	K		B		8	R	E	D		9
10	11		12				13		14	
	H	A		M		Y		P		D
15							16			
	R	U	S	I	A		M	O	R	I
17						18			19	
	U	N		K		H		L		O
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	S		M	O	L	O	T	O	V	L
21	22								23	24
	O	R		Y		Y		H		D
24							25			
	H	U	S	A	R		N	I	P	O
26						27				28
	E	S		N		E		A		N
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	V		S		I	R	A		I	N
	33									
	D	I	C	T	A	D	U	R	A	

Horizontales:

1. Gran enemigo de la libertad
8. ~~_____ de espías~~ Celada
10. Mao _____ reducido la cultura china a propaganda comunista.
14. Afirmación rusa, apenas usada en las Naciones Unidas
15. Primer país sufrir la tiranía roja
16. Imre Nagy fue condenado a _____ a manos de los comunistas húngaros.
17. Artículo indefinido
19. ¡Vaya!
20. Jefe bolchevique, ahora purgado
21. País de América Central (abreviación)
23. Preposición
24. Soldado de caballería
25. Nación democrática del Extremo Oriente
26. Existe
28. Conjunción
30. Enojo
33. Gobierno de la U.R.S.S.

Verticales:

2. Río de Siberia
3. País bíblico
4. Mariscal Bonapartista
5. Abreviación latina
6. Pronombre reflexivo
7. Déspota soviética

9. Dos dioses del comunismo internacional
11. Adverbio
12. Figura poderosa de la jerarquía soviética
13. Víctima de opresión comunista
14. Regalo
18. Despues de ayer
22. Planta botánica
23. Regalo
27. Época
29. La respuesta que el Kremlin obliga a los títeres comunistas
30. Abreviación
31. Partido político venezolano (abreviación)
32. Salir

Horizontal:

1. Great enemy of liberty
8. ~~Spy~~ (network) S-nare
10. Mao (has) reduced Chinese culture to Communist propaganda.
14. Russian affirmation, seldom used in the United Nations
15. First country to suffer Red tyranny
16. Imre Nagy was condemned (to die) at the hands of Hungarian Communists.
17. Indefinite article
19. Scram!
20. Bolshevik leader, now purged
21. Central American country (abbreviation)
23. Preposition
24. Cavalryman
25. Democratic country of the Far East
26. Exists
28. Conjunction
30. Anger
33. Government of the USSR

Vertical:

2. River in Siberia
3. Biblical country
4. Marshal under Bonaparte
5. Latin abbreviation
6. Reflexive pronoun
7. Soviet despot
9. Two gods of international Communism
11. Adverb
12. Powerful figure of the Soviet hierarchy
13. Victim of Communist oppression
14. Gave
18. After yesterday
22. Botanical plant
23. Gift
24. Epoch
29. The answer that the Kremlin demands from Communist puppets.
30. Abbreviation
31. Venezuelan political party (abbreviation)
32. To depart